Ukraine Summaries - Copy of Facebook posts by Tom Cooper

Here's the main summaries Tom Cooper has given since the start of the Ukraine conflict. Note that dates are NZ time

Who is Tom Cooper? - Essentially a military author with contacts in many countries, interested in modern conflicts and finding out what's actually happening.
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FEB 24
OK, the first 'quick & dirty' resume.
At 05.00hrs this morning, Putin declared war on Ukraine (which he called 'special military operation').
Russia opened the war with a massive attack by 9K720 Iskander (SS-26) tactical ballistic missiles and K-55/101 cruise missiles (many of the later from warships in the Black Sea, but even more so from Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers of the VKS).
They have targeted all the known military infrastructure: HQs/command and control facilities, bases, munition depots, factories, air bases and airfields.
As far as I can say: Ukrainians knew this would happen, and thus most of these have been evacuated (indeed, even the only video showing a strike on an ammunition depot indicated the latter was empty; well-positioned Ukrainian sources stress, they did not lose a single aircraft).
This was followed by air strikes, and there are few videos shown high-flying combat aircraft of the VKS (as far as visible because of the cloud cover), there are videos and photos of their ammo, and there are reports about Ukrainian casualties caused by 'bombs'.
As of 11.00hrs local time, Ukrainians claimed 5 Russian jets (including one Su-27/30/35) and 2 helicopters as shot down.
Finally, the Russian ground forces moved in. From what can be made out by now:
- there seems to be one push from the north, from Belarus in particular;
- there are at least two major pushes in the east, including in Luhansk, though it remains unclear if there was really an amphibious landing west of Mariupol
- from the south, from the Crimea and - unconfirmed - an amphibious landing near Ochakov.
What's next....?
I think we're not going to know before.... tomorrow in the morning at earliest. If not longer. Crucial will be to sort out details on the major Russian axes of advance from all the ambient noises.
One thing I'm sure by now: the Russians went in at the time of their chosing, but the Ukrainians were far better prepared than assumed. Of course, the latter didn't help many civilian victims already caused by the Russian onslaught...
The attached map of Ukraine is shown all the places from which attacks and/or combat have been reported as of this morning.
EDIT: PLEASE, don't jump to any kind of conclusions. Nothing like 'Russians can't capture this' or 'Ukrainians can't do that'. It's FAR TOO EARLY to say what which side can do.
The only thing sure right now is that the jerks in charge of the EU can't even agree what kind of sanctions to impose upon Putin. Austria, Italy, and Germany want to exclude banks, Italy wants to exclude luxury goods, Belgium wants to exclude diamonds....and everybody wants to exclude the energy sector... OMV-Gazprom-Rosneft rule.


Feb 25
UPDATE on Ukraine
According to the mass of what one can see on the social media, the Russian troops seem to be advancing from several directions into the centre of Ukraine, foremost in direction of Kyiv.
To a certain degree, the situation is similar to that of Iraq from the first day of the (unprovoked) US invasion in 2003: the Russians are running a 'shock and awe' campaign with ballistic- and cruise missiles, but these are hitting empty 'palaces', military bases, and decoys (like that Parol IFF system linked to a P-37, which everybody - including several Major-Generals acting as 'experts' for different TV-stations - is simply declaring for 'radar'). Simultaneously, their ground forces are racing in.
According to the General Staff of the Ukraine, for which there is enough evidence on the social media, too: all attacks have been stopped.
One way or the other, seems the Ukrainians didn't establish some sort of 'massive fortifications' along the border: instead, they're present in very small detachments - essentially 'observation posts' - which are quickly wiethdrawn whenever the Russians appear. Only to hit at the Russians where these expect this the least.
Unsurprisingly, there are reports about the Russian troops reaching the outskirts of Kyiv and Harkov, just for example, but also evidence for them suffering heavy losses.
Quite a 'confirmation' for my assessment for capabilities of the Russian armed forces was their heliborne assault on the Antonov International Airport, 15km west of Kyiv. Because they lack the night-fighting capability, they launched it later in the morning - and promptly lost some 6-7 helicopters shot down or forced to make emergency landings (like the Ka-52 on the attached photo; BTW, another one was shot down over the nearby lake; at least one of crewmembers ejected). That said, the survivors came through and are said to be holding the airport.
Overall, based on such impressions and President Zelensky's speech from this morning, it appears the Ukrainian armed forces either plan to withdraw into major cities and resist from there, or to 'melt away' and fight a guerrilla war.
....and that even if at least a part of Zelensky's cabinet seems to be keen to follow the US advice and flee.


Feb 25
Well, it seems the Russian heliborne assault on Antonov/Gostomel/Hostomel Airport, 15km NW of Kyiv, ended in a complete catastrophe.
Not only that the VKS paid a hefty price just to bring the airborne troops to their target (it lost 6-7 helicopters, including two confirmed Ka-52s; several of these to Ukrainian MiG-29s), but then the expected para-jump didn't take place. Obviously, the Ukrainian air defences are still up, and the Russians couldn't fly in the expected 18-20 Il-76s.
The Russian VDV held out as long as supported by their air force, this afternoon. But, later on, the 4th Rapid Response Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard counterattacked with support from the Ukrainian Air Force (the attached photo is shown an Ukrainian Su-24M bombing the Russians there).
What was left of the VDV was then finished by the 45th (Ukrainian) Spetsnaz Brigade: few survivors scattered and run away into the nearby forests.


Feb 25
Good morning, everybody!
I'll start the day with what appears an emerging urban legend. Correspondingly, there should be an Ukrainian MiG-29-pilot who have shot down 6 Russian jets yesterday - including 2x Su-35, 1x Su-27, 1x MiG-29M, and 2x Su-25 - and he's now nick-named the 'Ghost of Kyiv'.
I consider this for an urban legend in the making - and that for multiple reasons, roughly along the following lines:
- for a MiG-29 to score that many kills, it would have to carry lots of AAMs, too. Just for example, the MiG-29 captured on 2-3 videos over Kyiv yesterday was carrying drop tanks (see attached screen-caps), but no visible AAMs;
- MiG-29 can carry a maximum of 6 air-to-air missiles; missiles in service with the Ukrainian air force are such like R-27R (SARH, medium range, R-27T (IRH, medium range), and R-73 (IRH, short-range). Both types are well-known even to the CIA since Adolf Tolkachev's treachery of 1979-1985 (i.e. before they entered service); both are in service with the Russian Air-Space Force, too, and thus well-known to the Russians. They have certainly developed effective countermeasures already long ago. Countermeasures - like flares, of which we've seen a lot on diverse videos yesterday - can be highly effective against IR-homing missiles, just for example, greatly decreasing the chance of them scoring a hit, and thus a kill.
- Therefore, for one Ukrainian MiG-29 to score that many kills, it would have to fly several sorties; we've seen some videos of some 6-7 Ukrainian MiG-29s airborne yesterday, but I doubt this is enough for one of them to score all the 6 kills.
- Moreover, I followed related discussions in the social media, and saw how people were adding 1-2 kills with every 'new round'.
- There is no indication the VKS has deployed any kind of MiG-29s in this war. MiG-29 is on the way out of service in Russia and operated only by two training assets. The one that 'opened fire at civilians' (see the video here: , was an Ukrainian example, and it 'fired at civilians' simply because it was targeting VKS helicopters flying low over a village (helicopters in question were BEHIND the position from which this video was taken) - with S-8 rockets fired from B-8M pods.
- At least two of claims I've heard about were against VKS helicopters underway to Antonov/Gostomel/Hostomel IAP, not for any jet fighters;
- under the given circumstances, it's extremely unlikely that a single Ukrainian MiG-29 has scored all the known aerial victories, plus victories actually credited to the Ukrainian air defences (like the Su-27 known to have been shot down over downtown Kyiv early in the morning);
- and, finally, and as should be known, I do not consider any kind of claims for 'confirmed' until both pilots and both serial numbers of their aircraft are known. In this case, absolutely nothing is known about this 'Ghost of Kyiv'.
Overall, sorry to spoil the celebrations: insisting on evidence and facts is often making me a 'party crusher'.
Therefore, feel free to call me names now (should there be popular demand, I'll be happy to put together a list of all the names I've been called over the time; 'is going to be as funny as the list of all the 'intelligence services' for which I should be working, or by which I should be paid, assembled the last year....)
Thank you, everybody - for your attention and support.
****
PS As next, I've got to figure out how to respond to about 200+ new friend requests from the last evening... which is even harder because for me a 'friend' means something particularly special: foremost that the person can depend on me, no matter what (and the other way around) - while this seems to be taken very lightly and not the least seriously in these internet times, and that's not the least easy for me...
Ah yes: and I would like to forward my...ho-hum.... 'regards' to the crew of 'ELINT News' on Twitter - who simply copy-pasted my summary on the battle for Antonov/Gostomel/Hostomel IAP, yesterday evening, and then distributed it without ever asking if they can, any kind of credits etc. Guess, after 35+ years in this 'business', I got used to such jerks.

]


Feb 25
OK.... after, and/or despite several 'defensive successes' yesterday, this morning Ukrainian Armed Forces are facing crises on several frontlines.
NORTH
Russian forces seem to have punched through the defences north of Kyiv and are confirmed as having entered two outskirts of the capital: Bucha and Oblon. Fire-fights are confirmed from the downtown, too.
It's hard to assess what's going on, but considering that some of troops in question appear to be wearing Ukrainian uniforms, it's possible that this is some sort of 'special operation'. It's definitely causing chaos and uncertainty.
Russian VDV is certainly still active in the Antonov/Costomel/Hostomel IAP area: at least trying to support their survivors there with artillery fire.
SOUTH
Russians have captured Melitopol.
The situation in the Kherson area is quite uncertain: some say the Ukrainians have counterattacked, early this morning, and pushed the Russians back to the southern bank of Dnepr, others say the Russians smashed the Ukrainians there and are advancing in northern direction.
Attached is a video apparently taken early this morning, and showing the 'aftermath' of fighting in the Kherson area. Not sure if this was taken 'behind' Ukrainian or Russian line: the only thing I'm sure it's shown is a knocked out Ukrainian T-64s:

There are other videos, though, showing plenty of Russian artillery and soft-skin vehicles, and dozens of casualties, though (and I'm not re-posting graffic content).
(Attached map is not mine, but from Militaryland.net)


Feb 26
Before I go on: any of (dozens) of US-citizens, and (handful) of Ukrainian citizens that demand from me to post _lies_ 'in order to spread hope' are advised - indeed: encouraged - to stop reading right here.
I'm NO propagandist, and I'm NEVER going to offer anything else but fact-checking and information. If you want to read lies you like to read, go follow Vladimir Putin, Gerhard Schröder, Tucker Carlson, Donald Trump, any celebrity of your choice and similar characters.
With this war going on, 'the state of war' remains valid for my account, too: any attempts to troll me are going to be instantly reported and blocked, without any further warnings.
***
Now, let me try to resume the last 24 hours.... (and please mind: some details of the following are likely to be updated during the day, as more information becomes available).
By now, there is no doubt that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have the task to assault and occupy Ukraine as quickly as possible - and regardless the cost. The result is no 'elegant' military operation in which one side is suffering all losses: the Russians are assaulting, throwing ever more of new units into the fight, in ill-planned operations, without 'softening' defences with help of air strikes, ballistic- and cruise missile attacks, without sufficient artillery preparation. Speed is the essence. Unsurprisingly, they are frequently running into ambushes, making heliborne attacks and para-jumps on targets that are still heavily defended, and often suffering what would be considered as 'catastrophic' losses in the process.
There is no doubt that - contrary to the mass of pre-war Western assessments, certainly also contrary to the Russian expectations - the Ukrainians are resisting far more fiercely, and far more successfully than expected. They have not established any kind of fortifications directly at the borders to Belarus and Russia (except in the Luhansk and Donetsk areas, of course): thus, one could say they have 'left the Russians come in'. However, this had a simple reason: in this fashion, Ukrainian ground forces have avoided most of vicious Russian artillery barrages unleashed at the start of the war.
The net result is that - except in the south (that is: the area north of Crimea) - the Russian operation is already now badly behind schedule. The Keystone Cops in Moscow have obviously expected to collapse Ukrainian defences with a series of quick and 'light' assaults, combined with a 'shock and awe' campaign including about 150 ballistic- and cruise missiles, launched in two waves, and about 70 air strikes, already on Thursday (24 Feb, first day of the war). This didn't work. Therefore, since yesterday, the Russians are running their 'Plan B', which is including a massive onslaught on all frontlines.
As far as the information is available, the fighting in specific parts of Ukraine over the last 24 hours can be summarised as follows:
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Ukrainian armed forces have used ballistic missiles to hit the Millerovo Air Base - one of major installations of the 4th air And Air Defence Forces Army of the VKS, in the Rostov area. At least one Su-30SM interceptors of the 31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, home-based there, was destroyed on the ground. The fact any kind of Ukrainian missiles came so far is another indication for how ill-prepared are the Russian armed forces for this conflict. They simply didn't expect anything of that kind and thus even their S-300/400 'Wunderwaffen' failed to interept the incoming Ukrainian missile that targeted one of most important VKS installations in this part of Russia.
NORTH
Currently, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have over 30,000 troops deployed on this frontline.
Russian forces have launched a second, massive heliborne assault on Antonov/Hostomel/Gostomel IAP, yesterday. This time came in with 200+ helicopters, full electronic warfare support, and full fighter escort. As a consequence, only local, ground-based Ukrainian air defence assets (essentially: Army troops armed with MANPADs and light anti-aircraft artillery) were able to fight back at first. They claimed some 5-6 helicopters as shot down while the Russians were still approaching. That said, what happened after is 'unclear', simply because the area is now some 10km behind the southernmost Russian frontlines (those in the outskirts of Kyiv). The Keystone Cops say they have secured the control of this strategically important installation, but there is no doubt that the Ukrainians are still resisting there. Overall: 'situation unclear'.
It is still unclear how, but, yesterday, early in the morning, Russian Spetsnaz troops wearing Ukrainian Army uniforms have managed to infiltrate the northern outskirts of Kyiv. They were detected as such only while reaching suburbs of Obolonsky, Vorzel, Buch, and Irpen. They appear to have been followed by Chechen mercenaries. Both had the task to capture or kill members of the Ukrainian government. Some have managed to advance all the way down to the St Sophia's Cathedral, which is on the northern fringe of the downtown Kyiv, and the 'government district' there. Some are active inside the underground network, too. Multiple fire-fights erupted as the assailants were detected. This is what caused immense uncertainty in Kyiv, and prompted the mass of the Western media to start talking about 'imminent fall' of the Ukrainian capitol (which, obviously, is pure nonsense).
Simultaneously, the Russians assaulted the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant in the northern outskirts of the city. The Ukrainians have recovered the same, later in the evening.
Meanwhile, further north-east, the Russian forces that captured Chernobyl in northern Ukraine, continued their advance in southern direction, reaching the town of Chernihiv, about 145km north of Kyiv, yesterday in the morning. The situation there is 'unclear', but, there is no doubt that they then by-passed that place and continued down the E95 road into Kyiv's eastern suburbs.
In an attempt to encircle Kyiv, the Russians then launched an airborne assault on the area of Bila Tserkva, 120km south of Kyiv. Next to no details about the situation there are available, except that the Ukrainians claimed to have shot down one of big transports (full of paratroopers) by their air defences, and then another by their Su-27s. Perhaps in relation to this operation, a Russian Su-25 was shot down near Kalynivka, in the Vinnytsya area (120-150km south-west of Kyiv).
EAST
Currently, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have about 30,000 troops deployed on this frontline. Add to this the forces of Putin-controlled separatists in Luhanks and Donbas.
About 200km east of Kyiv: City of Konotop (home-base of the Ukrainian 58th Mechanised Brigade) is under siege by Russian forces.
Following a nocturnal counterattack by Ukrainian forces, which mauled the first Russian battalion to enter the town of Sumy, in the night from 24 to 25 Feb, Russians have brought in new forces and secured the northern outskirts of this town, yesterday in the morning. Presently, the centre of Sumy appears to be under Ukrainian control, with the Russians holding its northern side. Their other units then bypassed and advanced on Konotop to the west and on Kharkivv to the south-east.
Kharkiv is under assault from three directions (NW, N, and NE). Ukrainian forces there - including the 1st Tank Brigade - are holding out, and that well. That said, this is an area from which there are the least details. The best assumption is that the Russians are trying to surround this city of about 1 million.
The mass of regular Ukrainian Armed Forces deployed along the 'cease-fire lines' of Luhansk and Donbas is still holding out, regardless what are the Russians throwing at them. So far, the Russians seem to have managed only a minimal advance north of Luhansk. However, further north the Russians have managed to advance from the international border up to 20km deep into the Luhansk Oblast. Like in the case of Kharkiv, there are very little news from this part of Ukraine.
SOUTH
Currently, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have about 12,000 troops deployed on this frontline.
As reported yesterday, and the day before, the Russian advance from Crimea went for Kherson on Dnepr River, in north-western direction, and Melitopol in north-eastern direction. Yesterday early in the morning, the Ukrainians have counterattacked north-east of Kherson causing a bitter battle, with heavy losses on both sides, and seem to have managed to push the Russians to the southern bank of Dnepr. However, meanwhile there is no doubt that the Russians then managed to cross the river further north, and are trying to advance north and then west of Kherson (mind: whenever the Russians establish a bridgehead over some river, that's becomig their 'Schwerpunkt' and then they invest everything they have into such a crossing). This battle is presently going on: both fighter-bombers and TB.2 Bayraktars of the Ukrainian air force are active on this frontline. Local Ukrainian air defence units have reportedly shot down a Russian UAV there, too.
Further east: Melitopol should be - at least 'largely' - under the Russian control. They should have managed to maul an Ukrainian Army unit preparing for counterattack, north of that town - apparently with a combination of air strikes and artillery. However, as of this morning, bitter fighting is reported from there.
Further east: according to the Pentagon, the Russian Navy launched an amphibious operation west of Mariupol. The Pentagon claims that 10 involved amphibious assault ships have landed 'thousands of infantry'. With this, the port of Mariupol is likely to become cut off from the rest of Ukraine. That said, this is anything else than confirmed by independent sources, and thus the situation in this part of the country remains unclear (except that Mariupol is still and very much indeed, under Ukrainian control).
For a detailed list of equipment losses on both sides - as far as this can be confirmed by videos and photos - see:
www.oryxspioenkop.com/.../attack-on-europe...
DIPLOMATIC SCENE
USA and EU have imposed sanctions on Putin, Lavrov and all the other members of the mafia known as 'Russian government'. US and EU governments are babbling about 'crippling' sanctions. Actually, Germany and Hungary are still blocking the decision to cut off Russia from the SWIFT (which would be important because this would block Russian exports of oil and gas - so also to China: keep in mind, Russia has no pipelines to the PRC, and without the SWIFT, it would have immense problems to construct any).
'Instead', the US government offered Zelensky an asylum: he flatly refused. As of this morning, he was definitely in Kyiv, running the government and visiting troops. Klitchko (Mayor of Kyiv) is on the frontlines, too.
At least France and several other members of the NATO are continuing to ship arms to Ukraine. In turn, Poland is receiving Ukrainian refugees.
My assessment: severe sanctions against Russia are coming at least 8 years too late. Even if Russia would be cut off from the SWIFT, that would be next to useless. Contrary to the West, which is facing this war entirely unprepared, Putin has had all the time to prepare for this eventuality, and has bunkered dozens of billions to finance this adventure. Therefore, the sanctions now are (far) too little, far too late, and are going to have no effect upon Putin's capability to wage this war.
For all practical purposes, there is no other conclusion in this regards than that the West de-facto ENABLED Putin to destabilise and now to invade Ukraine. I said something similar nearly a week ago, but I'll repeat it now to emphasise: for the West, and by all the intelligence information acquired and provided on time, this 'crisis', this WAR, is actually a 'political Pearl Harbour', worsened by widespread treachery of corrupt politics.


Feb 27
This is to address few questions asked by several of you today, the answers to which I find are highly important for the developments on battlefields in Ukraine.
1.) Is the Russian invasion of Ukraine poorly planned?
Yes, definitely so. As for ‘why’, that’s going to take a while to explain. Get yourself some coke, tea/tchay, or coffee now…
The top military authority in Russia, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (short: GenStab), is something like ‘elite’ of the Russian military. This de-facto separate branch of the Russian military is staffed by, literally, hand-picked ‘brains’, doing nothing else but thinking about the wars of tomorrow, and theorising about what are they going to look like. On the basis of such assessments, they are bringing all the decisions about how is the Russian military going to be organised, trained, and equipped. This is why the GenStab is the sole military authority in Russia to place all the orders for new equipment – from screws, via combat aircraft and warships, to the intercontinental missiles. The GenStab is the sole procurement authority in Moscow. Period.
By all respect for all the brilliant minds serving with the GenStab, they have repeatedly proven as hopelessly incompetent in analysing experiences from different ‘local’ wars of the last 70 years. At least it is my impression – based on reading a number of publications by officers of the GenStab over the last 6-7 years – that they’re ‘regularly missing the point’. I.e. losing themselves in some sort of incomprehensible conclusions, regularly irrelevant to the actually important experience.
Foremost, the GenStab has 0 operational control over any units. All the operational control is exercised by HQs of single Military Districts. These are ‘joint forces commands’, unifying the command, control, and communications of all the forces – air, ground, and naval - within their geographic area of responsibility.
Officers commanding local MDs are educated at military educational facilities advised by the GenStab, but the emphasis in what these facilities are teaching them is an all-out conventional war against the NATO, either short of deployment of nuclear weapons, or including the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, their education is not preparing Russian officers for fighting wars like the one in Syria or now in Ukraine: instead of studying such experiences, the Russian officers are spending years studying Zhukov’s advance on Berlin.
The result is a giant gap between how is the GenStab envisaging the Russian armed forces to fight, and how are commanders – whether the Keystone Cops in Moscow (MOD), or the local commanders (in this case the HQ of the Western Military District) – ‘translating’ the GenStab’s advice into orders.
Indeed, with few minor exceptions, and then in ‘easy’ cases (Ukraine, 2014-2015), top Russian generals are regularly proving themselves as anything between ‘overenthusiastic’ and ‘professionally incompetent’.
At the same time, they are disconnected from reality through indoctrination about all sorts of fantasies. For example: ‘Ukrainians are not going to fight’, ‘just land the VDV or Spetsnaz in Kyiv and they’re going to run away’, ‘will be easy to crush the NATO-Nazis’ and similar nonsense (back in Syria of 2015 it was, ‘just show them you’re Russian troops, they’re going to run away on sight’).
Means not they do not know how to run their troops in combat, or they like ideas. It only means their decisions are frequently resulting in casualties, losses and situations that would be considered 'entirely unacceptable' - by Western standards.
Bottom line: the Russian generals are frequently issuing unrealistic orders, completely disregarding the safety of their own units.
If then somebody like Putin starts to meddle into their decision-making (and politicians are always meddling, and know everything better) things can only get worse.
(BTW, don’t worry: there’s plenty of similarly idiotic indoctrination – outright 'dogmas', usually based on little else but prejudice - everywhere in the West, in the Middle East, in Asia, and anywhere else. Precisely that is one of reasons why I’m studying so many of ‘small wars’ since 1945.)
Another good example for unrealistic planning are their logistic preparations of formerly Soviet and nowadays Russian generals. Excellent example: back in 1987, when planning an Angolan advance on Mavinga, Russian generals (i.e. back then Soviet generals) calculated fuel needed as if their units would drive down a highway into Western Europe. There are simply no such highways in Angola even today: unsurprisingly, the involved units run out of fuel after travelling less than a quarter of distance from Cuito Cuanavale to Mavinga, and for the rest of that battle, the Angolans never managed to resupply them properly.
I'm mentioning this intentionally for there were not only reports about undersupplied Russian units already before the invasion of Ukraine, but there is now a growing number of reports about Russian tanks and other armoured vehicles running out of fuel, troops foraging food etc. This is certain to worsen in the coming days.
2.) Is Russia moving other units to the frontlines in Ukraine?
Some are still in transit, but, in essence, Putin has already ordered a re-deployment of everything the Russian armed forces have to Ukraine – and that before this invasion. As of Wednesday the last week, he was having about 70% of the Russian armed forces deployed there, with about 10% in the process of transit. With other words: there’s next to nothing left to re-deploy, expcept Putin orders a widespread use of conscripts.
3.) Has the Ukrainian GenStab (yes, they have their own GenStab, organised along the lines of the Russian GenStab) come up with its own doctrine?
If so, they applied this too late. There is no doubt that Zelensky mistrusted the Western intelligence reports and warnings, just like the mass of Western politicians did. HOWEVER, contrary to the last few related Westsern reports I've seen, there is also no doubt, Zelensky did mobilise much of the Ukrainian armed forces ‘silently’, days before officially announcing this. Silently in order to prevent panic, but also to prevent provoking Moscow.
Thus, the Ukrainian armed forces entered this war in much better condition than expected.
Similarly, there’s no doubt that Zelensky has at least ‘influenced’ additional reforms of the armed forces, in the last 1, perhaps 2-3 months. They are in good control over much of Ukraine until this very day. Nerves in Kyiv are quite shaky, but they are holding out there much longer than the Russians have expected (not to talk about the mass of Western analysts).
Still, in grand total, all of this was too little, too late.
Right now, the Ukrainian options are constantly decreasing. Not only because they’ve got de-facto no navy, or because their air force is limited to daring escapades between what must be dozens of Russian SAMs and air-to-air missiles. But their Army has ever less space to manoeuvre – and thus evade the Russian fire-power. They are already starting to make mistakes with control and identification of their own units, and there are indications of their meagre air force hitting own forces (this is one of reasons why is it as important to avoid descending into mythology, and remain factual!). The remaining forces are herded into ever smaller area and exposed to immense pressure from all directions: there are NO WORDs that can describe their predicament even roughly.
Therefore, their focus is meanwhile two-fold: hold major urban centres, as long as possible, and thus protract the war. Make the war as costly for the Russians as anyhow possible.
Why that?
The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is it’s going to be stopped in a way not favourable for Putin.



Feb 27
Good morning everybody!
One request up front (indeed: a plea): please read my daily summaries. That would help us avoid questions that have already been addressed. I’m very busy just collecting and cross-checking all the info.
****
For the start: Western assessments along which, say, ‘Russia failed to encircle and isolate Kyiv’, are nonsense. The more info is becoming available, the clearer it is that Russia didn’t even try doing that. It tried a ‘thunder-run- & false-flag-style’ operation of driving into the city centre to kill or capture the government – and failed in that.
Similarly, reports along which Putin ordered a stop of advance for negotiations (Putin’s spox Peskov), or that the Russians ‘temporarily abandoned efforts to seize Chernihiv and Kharkiv’, are nonsense. As we’re to see yet, they only started seriously.
Ukrainian claims that Putin has fired the Chief of the General Staff, Army General Gerasimov have proven wrong. No surprise, actually: surprising is only that now it’s the Ukrainians who claim Gerasimov has ordered an all-out attack on Kyiv, the last night.
Finally, indicating how dangerous it is to fall for illusion that the social media is telling us everything one might want to know is the fact that the crucial frontline of this war is meanwhile not Kyiv, but the southern one. The weakest of all the Ukrainian frontlines. The Russian operational group there has broken through and it’s threatening Zaporozhye. That, ladies and gentlemen, and not the suburbs of the Ukrainian capital, is going to be decisive for the outcome of the first phase of this war.
AIR
The Ukrainian air defences were heavily hit in the first two days, but surviving elements remain active. Over the last 24 hours, they claimed to have shot down a VKS Su-25 and an Il-76 using S-300s, plus an Il-76 by Su-27 interceptor. Official US sources confirmed the two Il-76s, but there is no independent confirmation yet.
Ukrainian Air Force, which was evacuated and dispersed to numerous airfields in west and south-west, should’ve flown about 40 combat sorties the last 36 hours, mostly with Mi-24s, Su-25s and TB.2 UCAVs, and almost exclusively over southern central Ukraine. A Su-25 was shot down over the Kherson area, this morning, and its pilot killed.
The Russian air force…. Really hard to say what was it doing yesterday. Air strikes were reported on suburbs of Mariupol, but especially on targets north of Kyiv. This morning, the VKS bombed derelict and stored aircraft at the Mariupol Airport. The chief spox of the Keystone Cops in Moscow, Major-General Konashenko….sigh… sorry if I start rambling now, but I’m not surprised he’s both still a spokesperson and a Major-General, for some 7-8 years meanwhile (usually, he should’ve been promoted after four years). He’s still appearing like living a daydream during his press conferences, too – exactly like back in 2015-2016. Well, Konashenko claimed the destruction of ‘800 military facilities’ in Ukraine, apparently including numerous air bases.
Since he failed to provide any details, I guess I’m free to conclude that he still counts every single bomb dropped by the VKS as ‘1000% direct hit and destruction of the target’….
NORTH
According to Konashenko, the Russian Army has deployed a total of 14 BTGs north of Kyiv, and started to commit its operational reserve of 17 BTGs there. That’s confirming my assessment from yesterday about the Russians deploying about 30,000 troops in this sector.
….and is quite relative, because there is meanwhile no doubt that much of deployed equipment is in poor condition, and it takes time to tow it closer to the city. Thus, they’ve spent most of the day yesterday just trying to move all that gear to Kyiv – from the north and from north-east. This helped the Russian forces to stabilise their hold on north-western outskirts of Kyiv. Roughly clockwise: they’ve reinforced VDV troops that captured the Antonov/Hostomel/Gostomel IAP (in the course of the second heliborne assault, on 25 Feb), and deployed the Chechens to secure the base of the 4th Rapid Intervention Brigade of the National Guard, nearby. Further east, they’ve reinforced Spetsnaz troops that penetrated northern outskirts of the capitol. That said, mechanised units – equipped with tanks etc – are yet to be seen there, and, generally: all the Russians have right now is a narrow corridor down the western bank of Dnepr River. It’s rather so that the Ukrainians can’t deploy their operational reserve to hit them in the flank (from the west, for example) – not only because the Russians now hold Antonov/Hostomel/Gostomel, but because of the Russian supremacy in the air, and far superior artillery, but because the Ukrainians seem not to have forces left to run such an operation.
The second prong of the Russian drive into Kyiv, the one from north-east.,..that’s unclear. Some say it was smashed by the defenders, and the assailants – partially including Chechens - forced to withdraw out of the city (there are quite a few rather grim videos showing the destroyed trucks and plenty of bodies left behind). Others say the Russians are holding a narrow corridor down one of highways.
Further West, Ukrainians reported yesterday in the morning a Russian heliborne landing north of Lvov. Mi-24 helicopters of the Ukrainian air force were seen in action in that area, too, but then no further reports followed.
Eventually, it was only this morning that the Russian airborne landing 'somewhere between southern Kyiv and Bila Cerkva', from yesterday morning, was confirmed: the Russians are in the process of assaulting the Vasilkovo Airport in the northern outskirts of Fedosiya. This is where a fuel depot was blown up, early today (explosion was visible all the way to Kyiv, 40km further north).
EAST
The Keystone Cops in Moscow didn’t say how many troops they have deployed in this sector, but from the troops captured by the Ukrainians yesterday (and that was over 200), it seems they’ve got elements from the 1 Guards Tanks Army, 20th Combined Arms Army, and the 41st Combined Arms Army already in action (for example: elements of the 2nd Tank Division, 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division – yes the famous ‘Tamanskaya Division’, usually guarding Moscow and performing on Red Square parades in May -, 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, 35th Motor Rifle Brigade etc.).
Ukrainian sources are indicating the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army is kept in reserve. Thus, my assessment for deployment of about 30,000 troops should still be OK.
This morning, the Russians have breached the defences of Kharkiv and drove a column all the way into the centre of the city. This was confirmed by local civilian authorities and several videos (some showing burning Russian IFVs). Fighting is going on.
That said, the mass of Russian forces deployed in north-eastern Ukraine spent the day yesterday bypassing Chernihiv and Kharkiv. Although severely delayed - by Ukrainian ambushes, because the columns are repeatedly losing their way, but also due to lack of fuel and supplies - they have entered Volokhov Yar, about 70km southeast of Kharkiv, yesterday late in the morning. Gauging by their average rate of advance, it might take them another two days to reach Kyiv from this side, but it is equally possible they’re going to be re-routed in direction of Zaporozhye instead (should any of Keystone Cops in Moscow come to the idea to engage the 35th Combined Arms Army).
Further east, i.e. in Donbas…. the Ukrainian units along the Line of Contact (LOC) are still holding out, but this appears to be rapidly becoming irrelevant. The Russians are in the process of breaching through in the Luhansk area (there is always a limit of how long can any unit hold out against sustained air strikes, artillery barrages and ground attacks), and are definitely driving into Ukraine from the north-east. Probable objective: Zaporozhye. Should they manage that, they would cut off the best units of the Ukrainian army in the east.
SOUTH
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have at least 12,000 troops deployed in this area, and they seem to be in the process of adding another 5,000 to that number.
If I’m to ask, this is meanwhile the very epicentre of this phase of the war. Here, the Russian commander was having something like a ‘field day’, yesterday. After securing Melitopol, late on 25 February, his forces rapidly fanned out and made a good advance in northern direction to reach Bilozerka and Tokmak, only 80km south of Zaporozhye, and in eastern direction, to capture Berdyansk, 70km west of Mariupol. This morning, they have reached the outskirts of Zaprozhye (see: .
With this it's clear that the Ukrainian forces east of the Dnepr River are de-facto cut off from the rest of the country. Now it's a matter of days before they run out of fuel, and then ammo.
In theory, the only worry of the local Russian commander would be the Kherson area. The Ukrainians not only recovered the town as of early in the morning yesterday, but recovered Nova Karkhovka too. Thus, they cut off a Russian unit advancing west of Dnepr - in directio of Mikolayiv. The same was subjected to air strikes by Su-25s and TB.2s (see: ), too, but one of Su-25s was shot down this morning, and its pilot killed (see attached photo).
US reports about a massive amphibious landing west of Mariupol were entirely wrong. It seems the Russian Marines are actually leading the advance from Crimea on Zaporozhye.
CONCLUSION
All the media attention at Kyiv is misleading. The Russians are taking time with mopping up and securing their corridor into the northern parts of the city there, and it might take days for them to resume an all-out attack.
The biggest issue right now is if the Ukrainians have sufficient forces to stop the Russian advances on Zaporozhye – and that from three directions at the same time (north-east, east, and south). If not, the best elements of the Ukrainian Army are going to find themselves surrounded and cut off from the rest of the country, east of the Dnepr River, especially in Kharkiv and the Mariupol areas.
And it’s definitely sure now: Putin is going for all of Ukraine. It’s only his armed forces that proved unable to effect that – at least not at the desired speed.
This is going to be no quick walk in the park, but a long and bitter war.




Feb 28
Good morning everybody!
Today, 5th day of the war in Ukraine, I’ll continue the coverage of events over the last 24 hours, and answer a few questions, too. There’s too much activity on the diplomatic/international plan: the mass of that is useless babbling. Sufficient to say that the West – plus Japan and South Korea – have imposed massive sanctions upon Russia, blocking de-facto all the trade, all the Russian assets abroad, and all the cooperation in a mass of other fields (space, sports etc.). Let me concentrate on military developments instead.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
Putin has put his nuclear forces on ‘special alert’, as ‘deterrence’ against ‘aggressive statements by the NATO’. There was no reply from the USA and/or NATO – and that’s good that way. Better to avoid engaging in a spiral of escalation with a bully.
AIR
The EU – repeat for emphasis: the EU – is intending to donate old MiG-29s and Su-25s of different NATO-air forces to Ukraine. Sounds logical: Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria etc. are still flying MiG-29s, for example. Ukrainians can fly such jets, even if their communications and IFF have been significantly modified over the time. Still, I consider this for useless political decision in style of, ‘we must do something’. It’s going to make Ukrainians happy, no doubt, but, jets in question are 40 years old and ‘bent’ from all the training over the years, and some of installed equipment (especially IFF and radios) is not going to be ‘compatible’ with the Ukrainians. On top of that, it’s near pointless, because of the massive Russian superiority, and hiding fighter jets is anything else than easy. Thus, I’m curious to see if and how anything of this kind might be realised.
‘Hiding fighter jets’ brings me to a question several have asked yesterday. That is: how does the Ukrainian Air Force operate? In the night prior to the Russian aggression, it dispersed its aircraft and helicopters on airfields in the west and south of the country. A few are at ‘official’ air bases, but the mass is at minor airfields. Even then, Ukrainians are keeping them 1000-4000 metres away from any runways, well-concealed. Thus, except for destroying many of old, ‘stored’ – actually: abandoned – jets left behind, the Russians hit less than a handful of Ukrainian combat aircraft and helicopters on the ground.
For the Russians,´finding these jets is anything else than easy. Because Ukrainian S-300s are still operational, the Russians can’t freely move their handful of precious Tu-214R reconnaissance jets equipped with SLARs. They can’t bring them closely enough to find Ukrainian jets on the ground. Thus, they have to wait for Ukrainians to fly.
Now, MiG-29 and Su-25 were built for operations from ‘primitive’ facilities, can use even grass runways. That far, no problem. Where there is a massive problem is the command and control of such a ‘force’: what jet is where, which one to scramble in what case, and, hand on heart, one can’t just scramble a jet and send it ‘to attack whatever enemy it finds’, nowadays. Jets are moving very fast. What’s ‘here’ one moment, is ‘there’ the next, and thus easier to completely miss than to find. Moreover, the Russians are ‘hiding’ their aircraft with massive volumes of electronic warfare, and thus any Ukrainian jets that are airborne but do not have very specific targeting information, only serve as targets for the enemy. Especially, MiG-29 needs good support from the ground control to operate effectively: it needs ground control to tell the pilot where is the target and what is it doing. Unsurprisingly, Ukrainians have already lost a number of MiG-29s – to Russian interceptors, to surface-to-air missiles and other Russian weapons.
By now, Ukrainian Air Force can operate only in the west and the south, where the Russian air defence- and electronic warfare assets have not yet been deployed, are too far away, or are yet in the process of development. This is why we only see videos of Ukrainian Su-25s attacking advancing columns of the Russian Army, and then, primarily, in the south, where the battlefield is ‘still fluid’. When doing so, they are facing a full range of air defence means, from AKM assault rifles to S-400s (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SS-21 Growler’). Unsurprisingly, they’re flying very low, to limit detection and exposure – and still suffering heavy losses: at least 3 Ukrainian Su-25s were shot down yesterday and this morning. Apparently, all their pilots were killed.
Why such losses? Fast- and low-flying jets operating in the skies ‘saturated’ by enemy aircraft and air defences are ‘perfect targets’ for own air defences, too – as there is no way for ground troops well-supplied with MANPADs to say which is Russian and which is Ukrainian, while Russian aircraft are better-protected by countermeasures. Unsurprisingly, at least one of three Ukrainian Su-25s lost yesterday and today was shot down by own troops.
Generally, when you see a video shown a jet over Ukraine these days, you can gauge the following: if flying low, it’s Ukrainian. Only Russian Su-25s are flying low: all others are operating at medium and high altitudes.
Operations-wise, the Keystone Cops in Moscow claim the destruction of over 1,150 military targets in Ukraine, and have, for the first time ever, admitted suffering casualties – but without providing any kind of figures. They also declared ‘total aerial superiority’ in the skies, indicating there must be a reason why they’re as happy (probably shot down some Ukrainian MiG-29s and/or Su-27s).
The whole afternoon, Russian forces deployed in Belarus continued firing 9K720 Iskander (ASCC/NAtO-codename ‘SS-26 Stone’) tactical ballistic missiles at Ukraine. One, after the other.
NORTH
Despite announcements of ‘massive aerial onslaught’ and reports about ‘Russian attacks on Kyiv’, the area around the Ukrainian capitol is relatively quiet. Actually, the Russians are trying to push a mass of their mechanised units down the corridor along the Dnepr River, an they are widening that corridor towards the west. So much so, roads north of Kyiv are choke-full of Russian military vehicles (see attached sat-photos taken by Maxar). The same is valid for north-eastern approaches to Kyiv.
EAST
The Russians are both pushing their forward units in between Chernhiv and Kharkiv (both of which are meanwhile encircled), and rushing (or at least towing) additional units into this gap. Russian Army units deployed in this area are suffering the worst losses so far, definitely have very poor morale, and a bare minimum of supplies. That’s why I say ‘towing’: many of involved combat vehicles are broken or out of fuel. Many are abandoned by their crews for mechanical breakdowns; others because their crews are shocked by Ukrainian resistance. This is why the Russian advance on Kyiv from this direction is now lagging days behind the schedule.
That said, yesterday morning (27 Feb 22), there was another ‘thunder run’ by a Russian mechanised forces – this time into downtown Kharkiv. Stretched along major roads in between densely built neighbourhoods, this was hit by defenders, suffered losses and was forces to retreat. The city remains under Ukrainian control.
West of Kharkiv, the Russians reached Okhtyrka, but were repulsed when trying to enter the town. They then turned around and continued in direction of Poltava.
This is all classic Soviet/Russian tactics: advance on urban centres, check if they’re protected, and if not, by-pass them.
Sumy is still under Ukrainian control, but surrounded by the Russians from three sides, while the mayor of Kupianks simply handed out the town to the Russians.
In Severodonetsk (population about 110,000), the last night, somebody hit the giant Azot fertiliser plant (owned by an Ukrainian oligarch, but financed by the Russians), causing a detonation comparable to the Beirut blast. Right now, I’ve got no further details.
Further east: any reports about the Russians making no territorial gains in Donbas are nonsense. Ukrainians are holding out on most of the LOC, but withdrew from Shchastya to Sievierodonetsk (about 20km), and have lost Donske. Thus, their frontline was breached. Ukrainian officials have announced the recapture of Volnovakha, yesterday evening, but I have my doubts about this.
Mariupol is now surrounded from the west and the east and there are first reports about the Russians running probing attacks.
SOUTH
This area remains a ‘mechanised-force-commander’s paradise’ – for the Russians are continuing their rapid advances over the flat, frozen steppe in northern and eastern direction, there are lots of ‘meeting engagements’, air- and artillery-strikes, there is a major bridgehead with Russians trying to punch over Dnepr towards West, and at least on that side, the Ukrainians are counterattacking with everything at their disposal.
The Russians have completed the occupation of the southern bank of Dnepr from the Black Sea up to around Zaporozhye. Their troops are not yet inside Zaporozhye, though. The reason is the Russian bridgehead at Nova Kakhovka, from where they’re trying to assault Mykolaiv, while hit by Ukrainians from both flanks. Ukrainians are defending Kherson and Mykolaiv, and bringing in additional forces from the north. Their Su-25s and TB.2s remain highly active over this battlefield.
On the north-eastern side: the Russians are pushing on Zaporozhye, have reached Tokmak (not sure if they’ve taken it), and are attacking on Mariupol.
CONCLUSION
The classic Soviet/Russian military doctrine envisages campaigns of this kind to be run so that the Russian forces first ‘tie’ the enemy by numerous attacks on a wide frontline. Then, once the enemy has committed its reserves, and/or its strategic reserve is localised, the Russians are to deploy their major force (‘operational group’) for the main blow. This is how the theory goes ever since back in 1944.
….and is one reason why Gerasimov is only now rushing his ‘best’ units into Ukraine.
Other are as follows:
Strategists like him are always keeping about a third of their force in reserve. After all, and even if the NATO would never attack into Belarus, he can’t ignore the deployment of NATO forces in the Baltic states and Poland. He knows he couldn’t face such a threat with ‘B-class’ units, like the mass of those already involved in Ukraine. That’s why ‘A-class’ – ‘crack’, ‘elite’, ‘best-trained/equipped’ units are still kept back, whether deployed in Belarus or in western Russian Federation.
The main penetration into Ukraine took place in the ‘wrong’ part of the country: the south. It’s complex and taking time to get heavy, mechanised units to Crimea and then drive them all the way to the frontlines.
…which is why I have my doubts about Western reports along which the Russians have already deployed ‘three quarters’ of their available forces. They might have the intention to, eventually, do so, but about 50% of their troops available for this operation, are still not on the frontline.
Finally, one observation regarding official Ukrainian claims: as much as those released by the Keystone Cops are little more than a laugh, the longer this war goes on, the more are the Ukrainian releases about military developments reminding me about Armenian claims from the Second Nagorny Karabakh War of 2020. They simply can't be trusted.
Ah yes and: can one expect from the Russians to try linking-up with Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova? Yes, 1000% sure. This is definitely one of Putin's war aims. This is why his forces are pushing so hard on Mykolaiv: in order to reach Odessa (up to 80% of the population are Russians), and then Transnistria.

T-90s are appearing on the frontlines now.

a gigantic traffic jam of Russian Army vehicles about 70km north of Kyiv

No idea who drew this map (and I apologise to the author for 'lifting' it), but it's very good - and shown that there is no 'operational break', nor any kind of 'Putin's order to stop' - in the Russian advance.

1st March
To de-bunk - and close - this story, 'once and for all'.
When the Russian VDV and Chechen mercenaries overrun the Antonov/Hostomel/Gostomel International Airport for the second time, on 26 February, the Ukrainians have concentrated all of their artillery- and MRLS-fire, and - deliberately - destroyed all the hangars and all the aircraft. All the An-26s, An-28s, An-74s, An-124s, An-22s, and the An-225 were blown away.
Below a related screen-grab from a video released by the Russian MOD. It's shown a huge hangar, partially collapsed, with a burning aircraft inside.
If you like, blame Putin for this, but Ukrainians did it.
****
By this morning, the forward-most Russian units were already 30km further south-west. That is: YES, they are pushing into western Ukraine, with the aim of cutting off Kyiv from the land connection to Poland and Slovakia.


1st March
There seems to be a giant misunderstanding in the social media over the issue of 'Aerial Superiority', but also in regards on how are the Russians using their combat aircraft. Thus, let me explain two things.
1.) Yesterday, the Keystone Cops in Moscow have declared the 'possession of total Aerial Superiority in the skies over Ukraine'.
What does this mean?
In the theories on aerial warfare there are five 'grades' for the level to which air power is exercising control of the skies:
- aerial incapability
- aerial denial
- aerial parity
- aerial superiority
- aerial supremacy.
Each of these five grades has a counter-grade, which is diametrically opposite. Aerial Supremacy for one side means Aerial Incapability for the other; Aerial Superiority means Aerial Denial for the other, etc.
So far, I guess, everything is clear. However, what exactly does the 'Aerial Superiority' mean?
It means that the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) is 'largely/most of the time, though not yet totally/all the time' free to run combat operations inside the Ukrainian airspace - and that without disruption from the Ukrainian Air Force (UkAF). It means that the UkAF has next to no- or minimal chance of disrupting VKS operations, or causing it losses.
HOWEVER, this does not mean anything like 'all Ukrainian air defences are destroyed'. On the contrary: precisely the fact that these have not all been destroyed is a co-reason why the Keystone Cops in Moscow declared Aerial Superiority, but no Aerial Supremacy, or (to quote the People in Need of Fresh Air - i.e. the Pentagon - from the times of invasion on Iraq, in 2003: 'Total Aerial Supremacy'. Seems, they have their own, sixth grade).
Mind: even once the Russians would conclude (or launch another set of fake news) that they are in possession of 'Total Aerial Supremacy', this would still not mean that 'all the Ukrainian air defences are destroyed'. It would only mean the suppression of the Ukrainian air force and air defence force to the level where the VKS would enjoy the complete freedom of operations inside the Ukrainian airspace.
That would still be far away from 'we've destroyed all their light SAMs, MANPADs, and anti-aircraft artillery, too'.
2.) Video-games of the last 20+ years have created a completely fake impression of Russian aircraft types like Su-30, Su-34, and Su-35. In the West, they are widely praised as 'multi-role', i.e. 'can do everything' aircraft.
Perhaps they can. But if so, then only in theory. Foremost, this is the Western point of view, entirely unrelated to how and why the GenStab in Moscow has ordered the Sukhoi to develop these aircraft, or how is the VKS using them.
The reason the aircraft of the Su-27-family are as big was that originally (back in the 1970s), they were designed to operate over the battlefield in Germany - but from bases in Poland and Baltic states. And this because bases in East Germany were already crammed full with shorter-ranged types. Thus, they had to carry lots of fuel in order to reach the battlefield. That's why they are big. Because they are big, they had to get powerful engines, which was as 'fine', because powerful engines made them 'better dogfighters', and this was important because they were expected to outmatch types like F-15 and F-16, and so on...
Now, in the 1990s, the Indians came to the idea to request the Russians to develop them a 'multi-role variant'. They packed Western computers and other avionics into the big and powerful platform, resulting in the Su-30MKI. That - and all the subsequent and/or resulting variants - made the entire family 'famous' as 'multi-role' fighter-bombers. And that's how the mass of export customers is using these jets until today.
However, in Russia, things are entirely different. In Russia, it's the GenStab that is dictating everything. The GenStab had to take into consideration that Russia is huge, and thus VKS bases are very far from each other.
Big = more fuel = more range = better.
Moreover, along GenStab's theories, the Su-30SM is an 'interceptor', and thus the VKS is using it as an interceptor, and training its crews almost exclusively for this task.
The Su-35 is meant as 'cheaper/simpler/improved sub-variant' of the Su-30, based on the single-seat Su-27. I.e. in the VKS, it is also an 'interceptor' no 'multi-role'.
Actually, along GenStab's theories, there is no 'multi-role' aircraft.
Correspondingly, and because the Su-34 is meant to replace Su-24s, it is a 'light-' or 'front bomber'. Therefore, VKS' Su-34-crews are trained for that task, only. Sure, there was a period, some 6-7 years ago when, after complaints related to experiences in Syria, the VKS did train its Su-34-crews about to go to Syria on R-27s and R-77s. Even then, this was 'for self-defence purposes only'.
This practice was long since abandoned: 'no money and no time for all of that'. Ever since, there is only a minimal training in self-defence with R-73s.
Unsurprisingly, right now - and since this monring - VKS Su-34s are bombing Kharkiv (see attached screen-grab), and then with 'dumb' bombs. Why that? FAB-500M-62 are cheap, and the VKS has next to no stocks of PGMs; cluster bomb units (CBUs) like RBK-500s and OFBA-500 CBUs are 'good' because the Su-34s are still lacking in precision, too.
(No doubt, occasionally, you're going to see a photo of a VKS Su-34 equipped with, say, one or two R-77s. Don't worry: it was either taken in Syria, years ago, or for show purposes only. 'Nothing better but to impress those pesky Anglo-Saxons...' )




2nd March
Oh dear.... is this the modern-day Russian Army....?
Update: this column run out of fuel and food. The troops simply abandoned all the vehicles and went away.
The column was about a company of T-80s with some support elements. It was from the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division. An A-Class outfit: indeed, one of most-famed units of the Russian Army.
BTW, inside the vehicles, Ukrainians found MREs ('meals, ready to eat': that's military rations), that expired in 2012-2015... (i.e. as old as the troops supposed to eat them).
...no wonder, the kids abandoned their vehicles and 'went back home'...
No, I do not expect the Ukrainians to recover much of this. Most of the time, they take photos/videos and go away. It's complex just to get enough fuel for all these vehicles.

2nd March
Sorry for delay with my reporting on Ukraine today: by all the work, I still have a 'life' too. And, while driving out for some shopping, I've had some time to think and analyse. This resulted in the first feature on this sixth day of the Ukraine War beginning in an unusual fashion.
Red Storm Rising
by Valery Gerasimov
….erm… Tom Clancy (and Larry Bond)
Several readers-reactions yesterday helped crystalise a thought that appeared already few days ago – and then a thought related to the poor Russian planning for invasion of Ukraine, mentioned earlier.
Think big now, please. Keep the big picture in your mind.
Think this entire plot for this war on Ukraine: I find it nothing but stunning how reminiscent it is to the plot of Tom Clancy’s book _Red Storm Rising_ (written in cooperation with Larry Bond).
It’s so similar, that large parts of it make it appear as if Army General Valery Gerasimov followed the book to the last dot and comma.
He only changed geographic destinations.
First Moscow ‘complains’ about ‘genocide’ and ‘Nazis’. Then there’s a ‘terrorist attack’. Then there’s an ‘ultimatum’ the enemy to disarm. In the book it’s (West) Germany that should disarm, in real life it’s Ukraine. When the ultimatum expires, there are Spetsnaz and VDV assaults, followed by an all-out attack by ground forces…
Now, where there are major differences is the Soviet officer corps. Seems, Clancy considered them for ‘honourable warriors’. For example, his (from memory) ‘General Alexey’ is a skilled commander, rapidly climbing up the ladder from division-, via corps-, to the command of an operational group, until ending up as a Minister of Defence in the post-coup government in Moscow…
In reality, nothing of this is to be seen. Putin’s Minister of Defence, the uppermost Keystone Cop in Moscow, Shoygu, and Army General Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the GenStab – the core brain of the Russian armed forces – are offering next to no new ideas. Dogmas only. By all the studies of Zhukov and whatever warfare, their plot for this invasion went exactly along Clancy’s script, and contains only 1-2 ounces of new solutions – mostly on the tactical plan and for reasons related to the available technology.
At the strategic- and operational plan, they – and their subordinates – are showing absolutely no new solutions. They know only one way, which is: rush forward, then follow with superior numbers combined with superior firepower. Free along the motto: if stunning them doesn't works, well, when one ‘unloads’ the XY amount of troops and ammo upon the enemy, victory is granted. Everything else are exactly the same theories developed into dogmas since 1944 (see: Operation Bagration, on the Eastern Front...). This is repeated again and again.
It’s only us in the West who are ‘stunned’ by all of this, because a) the way the West fights wars the last three decades is so dramatically different, and b) the discipline of studying the Soviet/Russian armed forces degenerated into oblivion, already before 2014: we’ve forgotten what we used to know at least back in the 1980s.
Foremost, the war in Ukraine is showing that decades of endemic and systematic corruption under the Putin regime have subverted the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation into literal rubble (could’ve written ‘Rubel’ too, considering the performance of the Russian currency, the last two days). Russian military officers are either corrupt to the degree where they and their troops are selling fuel to Belarussian (and Azerbaijani) taxi-drivers, and trying to feed their troops with MERs expired in 2012-2015, or incompetent to the degree where they can’t sincerely explain the task on hand to their troops. Instead, they’re lying about exercises or liberation.
What a surprise when troops are then demoralised when running out of fuel or food, or confronted by Ukrainian civilians calling them ‘Nazis’ (there's no bigger insult for a Russian - even a Russian Neo-Nazi - but to call him/her/them a 'Nazi').
This is as ironic because chatting with few of them, the last few days (yes, there’re still ways to do so) turned out that they’re sincerely convinced they’re fighting to restore the USSR, to save Russia from becoming a ‘whore of Western imperialism’, that ‘Ukraine _must_ re-unite’, ‘must accept the rule from Moscow’, ‘must accept a dictatorship’, that ‘East is incompatible with democracy’ and other, classic, SOVIET and POST-SOVIET dogmas.
It is absurd, too, because while they are aware of endemic corruption, and blaming (multi-quote) ‘Shoygu’ for this, they do not want to accept that they are longing for the restoration of the USSR because they’ve had a better life back then, than they have under Putin now. Because of Putin.
And their points of view are ‘odd’ for us in the West, for they insist, for example, that the military has to have a role in the government.
(Some of us might now want to insist that this is 'unthinkable' in the West, but keep in mind the way the Pentagon-DIA-defence sector-conglomerate is regularly overruling the State Department-CIA conglomerate and dictating the US foreign policy of the last 70+ years).
At least from our, Western standpoint, the final absurdity of the Russian military officer's point of view is the level to which they are living in the period of 1917-1945. It's like in books by John Hackett: they know nothing about the West, nothing about the NATO - de-facto - disarming the last 30 years. They know nothing about how democracy functions. They only know they are threatened, and 'Americans' are bombing all over the planet, so they have to strike back and force the West to (quote), 'bow'.
So, it’s this mindset of top Sov...erm... Russian officers where Clancy was wrong. I guess he couldn't imagine the levels of corruption and fanaticism within.
(Make no mistakes, please: I am sure there is military professionalism in Russia, but I can’t see anything of it. It’s filtered out by Shoygu and Gerasimov on behalf of Putin.)
(...and a note for readers in Serbia and few other corners that might be hoping for something in this regards: while even ‘USA bombed Korea’ and ‘USA bombed Vietnam’ was mentioned: nope, none of them mentioned any kind of a ‘payback for Kosovo/Serbia’).
Another ‘detail’ that’s different to Clancy’s plot....well, actually nope: he didn't mention it, but let me discuss it.
It's the technology. This is where there is a major difference to how the Soviet commanders planned to attack (West) Germany as of, say, the 1980s. From what is meanwhile known about their contemporary planning (and that's filling few thick books), back then, they envisaged a massive deployment of air power.
Nowadays, the VKS is just a shadow of the former V-VS and V-FA: so much so, there are observers in the west talking about its ‘mysterious non-appearance’. And, by all the Russian disregard for 'losing machines', it seems reluctant to lose its ah-so-sexy Su-34s and similar stuff.
For those who paid attention not to succumb to both the influence of video games, Western arrogance, and/or Putin’s propaganda of the last 20+ years, it is not surprising that the VKS has next to none of famed ‘precision guided munitions’ (PGMs). They do not have the money to buy them, and - since 2014 - no production facilities: these were in Ukraine. Therefore, the VKS can't hit its targets precisely and from stand-off ranges. This is the reason why it had very little to do over Ukraine during the first few days of this war - at least until the Ukrainian air defences were sufficiently suppressed by a consistent barrage of ballistic missiles, and ‘few’ (about 150) cruise missiles.
And that's the 'biggest surprise' of this war so far: the barrage of Russian 9K720 Iskander (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SS-26 Stone’) – mostly fired from Belarus – is constant and sometimes massive, and that right from the start. Lacking PGMs, the Russians are firing dozens of models equipped with different warheads, every single day. Early on, primary targets were Ukrainian early warning radars (which are hard to conceal or move) and air bases. Meanwhile, they’re deploying them to target positions of tactical importance: the kind of targets for which the Western ground forces would call in an air strike. Through all of this time, the number of Iskander-related craters on Ukrainian air bases is increasing almost by hour….. and, of course, along the spox of the Keystone Cops in Moscow, Major-General Konashenko, every ‘hit’ is ‘one target destroyed’.
That much about the ‘plot’ and ‘major differences’.
What is left to be seen, obviously, is if this ‘story’ might end the same way it ended in Clancy’s book: with a military coup d’état in Moscow, that removed the wing of the Politburo which - as soon as the Soviet advance stalled - ordered the deployment of nuclear weapons.


2nd March
So, here my review for the last 24 hours:
Once again, many sources are reporting ‚nothing going on’ in Ukraine, yesterday and today. Sorry, this is simply not truth.
AIR
Ukrainian air defences remain active – just like, contrary to mass of Western reports, the VKS is very active. Yesterday, the Ukrainians claimed five Russian jets as shot down, incluidng a Su-30 and Su-35. Early in the morning today, UkAF claimed to have shot down three Russian jets, all by S-300s, and that in the areas named as Vasylkiv and Brovary. Furthermore, Ukrainian Buks should’ve shot down a VKS helicopter near Kyiv.
Russians continued pounding numerous air bases and airfields in central Ukraine yesterday. About 30 ballistic missile strikes on such facilities were recorded between 27 and 28 Feb (US intel is reporting that the Russians spent 380 ballistic missiles since 24 February (see: ...)
I know of no reports about activity of interceptors or fighter bombers of the UkAF, but since two days, Ukrainian Bayraktar TB.2s are proving themselves of being capable of operations in high-threat areas over the southern battlefield. That is: in the face of a large concentrations of Russian Pantsyr (SA-22 Greyhound), Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet), and Buk (SA-17 Grizzly) air defence systems. Indeed, seems, they’ve spent the last two days reducing these by quite some number (for details, please follow the Oryx blog: www.oryxspioenkop.com/.../attack-on-europe...).
NORTH
Between Kyiv and the border to Belarus, there is 75km+ long traffic jam consisting of densely packed Russian Army vehicles, lined up in two, sometimes three columns. The mass of vehicles is out of fuel, and there are immense communication problems. Units are using civilian- and obsolete military communication systems, and mostly communicating in clear. This is why it’s easy to track them and find out what’s going on (hear for example: ipfs.io/.../QmT93mdDcMMJVBTbVvnQJKUsroGrxqTBj83vS...). It is in this way that it’s meanwhile known that the closer any Russian unit gets to the frontline, the less officers are around. Some have completely abandoned their units.
The situation in Kyiv is tense, but the Russians are only running light, probing attacks against the Ukrainian defence line along the Zdwyzh River, north and west of the city (Ukrainians claim to have blown up all the bridges along the same). There is a curfew during the night, and around the noon today, Zelensky appointed General Mykola Zhernov the Head of the Military Administration of the city (Klichko remains the civilian mayor).
Between the defenders of the city should be quite a few foreign volunteers, meanwhile. RUMINT has it, the ‘most famous’ of these is the Alpha Group, led by a Briton, ex-SAS. Supposedly, they have recovered the hydroelectric dam in a pitched battle with the Spetsnaz, back on Friday (additional info on this ‘Alpha Group’ is most welcome, because I’m lacking the time to concentrate on searching for details about such outfits).
Few minutes ago, the Russians smashed the TV tower in Kyiv, too (see attached photo).
The situation is critical west of the city. During the night from 27 to 28 Feb, the 98th VDV (Airbone) Division of the Russian Army launched an attack from Hostomel/Gostomel towards south. The VDV is one of few ‘branches’ of the Russian Army still functioning reasonably well: intercepted communications and captured documents are indicating that VDV officers are providing reasonably good briefings to their troops. With this, they’re a major exception from the rules in the Russian Army of this war.
The last I was able to find about it, the 98th punched south across the highway E40 and by the last night went all the way to Mostyshche.
With this, the main- and shortest link between Kyiv and Zhitomir (and then to Lutsk and the Polish border) is cut off. There are two other highways further south, but both are a big de-tour.
I gave up trying to find reports from this area in the Ukrainian media: might be an indication of either panic, or intention to launch a counteroffensive there.
EAST
The garrison of Chenihiv was holding out yesterday evening. The Russian advance in between Chernihiv and Sumy was stopped by Ukrainian defence line roughly along the P67 motorway, between Nizhyn in the north and Pryluky in the south. The Russian commander of this area is still trying to move enough forces of his 2nd Echelon to renew the push Kyiv. HIs attempts are spoiled by ambushes, lack of fuel and other supplies, though. Essentially, the entire area between Nizhyn, Pryluky and the Ukrainian border is a huge 'no-man's land', with plenty of Russian military columns, but also well-armed Ukrainian guerrilla active there.
Sumy is still in Ukrainian hands, but slowly enveloped by the Russian Army. Ukrainians are claiming to have deployed TB.2s in this area, too, but I haven't seen any videos confirming this.
During the night, a massive artillery barrage hit the Ukrainian Army base in the town named Okhtyrka (roughly half-way between Sumy and Kharkiv), killing more than 70 soldiers and an unknown number of civilians.
Kharkiv is holding out, but the Russians advanced via Trostianets to Lebedyn, further north-west. The city was repeatedly subjected to artillery barrages and air strikes, yesterday and the last night. Possibly one SS-26 strike too (at least there was a major explosion at the Freedom Square, right in front of the Kharkiv Oblast Government Building), the last night.
Contrary to what some report, right now, I do not see any signs of ‘reorganisation’ or anything of that kind on the Russian side in this part of Ukraine. Their advance was slowed down due to heavy losses to Ukrainian ambushes, lack of fuel, food and awful communications. If there’s anything ‘good’ for the Ukrainians, then that their local commander is running quite an effective campaign of ‘hunting supply trucks’. That said, the mass of those caught are empty, indicating the same logistic problems as discussed elsewhere.
With othe words: this frontline is, more or less a chaos (think, the 'Russian military jargon' is something like 'Bardak', but then... hm, this should be readable for kids, too.)
SOUTH
The commander of Russian forces deployed in southern Ukraine appears to be one of few ‘hardliners’ – and then one leading at least form the proximity to the frontlines. And he’s doing the best of his situation, considering the Ukrainian TB.2s seem to have blown up a train with fuel for his units. Logical decision was to stop everything where it was, and concentrate on securing his western flank – and the bridgehead on the Dnepr River.
His forces launched a probing attack on Kherson, yesterday in the morning, withdrew, and then he brought in additional forces in the afternoon. The city's defenders were hit by a massive artillery barrage during the night. This was followed by attacks from north and east. Early in the morning today (1 March), the Russians have breached the defences of Kherson and entered it in force. Local civilian authorities have confirmed presence of numerous Russian troops and military vehicles in the city centre as of noon today. Fighting is still going on in the outskirts, but private Ukrainian sources report Russians ‘all around it’. Means, the Russian bridgehead west of Dnepr is not only secured, but they are about to mop up Kherson and then can continue the advance on Mykolaiv.
The Ukrainians claim to have recovered Tokmak, yesterday in the morning. Can’t find any confirmation for this, yet. If so, they’ve probably exploited the Immobilisation of the Russian units in this area - due to the lack of fuel. The latter was decisive for the Russian advance on Mariupol from the West pausing yesterday.
In the Donbass… as announced yesterday, the Russians punched north-west from Luhansk. By the evening they have captured Novoyadar and Nova Astrakhan. The Ukrainian forces are still holding their lines all the way from there to Buhas, but this is already under a massive Russian and Separatist attack. Really bad news for the Ukrainian commander here is that the Russians and Separatists have punched through the defence line further south, the one protecting Mariupol, and – advancing roughly along the coast of the Azov Sea - captured Hnutove.


2nd March
An update (sort of).... first photo of wreckage of a VKS (Russian Air-Space Force) aircraft shot down over Ukraine - both thanks to research by Milos Sipos: gauging by camouflage colour, the jet probably a Su-34. It was shot down over the Kharkiv area.
....and the first confirmation for the death of VKS pilot: Colonel Ruslan Igorevich Rudnev, a Su-25-flier, buried in Samara today.
(Should anybody wonder: just like the entire Russian Army is deployed around Ukraine, so is the entire Russian air force. They barely fly anywhere else in Russia, these days.)